{"id":1131,"date":"2019-11-05T17:53:28","date_gmt":"2019-11-06T00:53:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.constellationpolitical.com\/blog\/?p=1131"},"modified":"2019-12-22T15:46:39","modified_gmt":"2019-12-22T22:46:39","slug":"prop-cc-results","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.constellationpolitical.com\/blog\/prop-cc-results\/","title":{"rendered":"Prop CC Results & After Action"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The defeat of Prop CC marked another win in the recent run of success that Republicans have had with ballot issues; a further illustration of Republicans’ ability to win on the issues despite the fact that we can’t seem to get any of our candidates elected. I tend not to be very interested in ballot issues, however, our recent success has prompted me to take a look at the “No on CC” effort to see if we’re actually doing something dramatically different from the candidate side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Summary<\/u><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

\n<\/i> Prop CC was defeated 45% Yes – 55% No.
\n<\/i> Strong Republican turnout was a major factor in the defeat of Prop CC.
\n<\/i> Yes on CC spent twice as much as No on CC.
\n<\/i> No on CC began campaigning three months earlier than Yes on CC.
\n<\/i> Starting early allowed No on CC to build their organization and frame the issue before their opponents.
\n<\/i> The early start gave No on CC the necessary time to deploy a stronger door-to-door effort to help drive Republican turnout.
\n<\/p><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Outcome<\/u><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Prop CC was finalized with 46.3% Yes to 53.7% No. Public polling was scarce since this was an off year election and only two polls were released — one by Magellan Strategies<\/a> and one by CU<\/a>. However, they were in wild conflict<\/i>, even when adjusted to reflect actual turnout. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Prop<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Before all the “Monday morning statisticians” in the crowd get their pitchforks out for Magellan there’s a few things to consider. The difference between these polls is<\/em> a significant swing, take into account margins of error as well and it is possible that the No on CC effort was able to produce this kind of swing in public opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finance<\/u><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Total Spending<\/u><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The key story line in this campaign is how much more money Prop CC’s proponents spent than did its opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The effort on both sides included a number of different organizations. The Yes on CC effort was spearheaded by Coloradans for Prosperity<\/i>, and was supported by Great Education Colorado. The Yes on CC effort funneled almost all their efforts through Coloradans for Prosperity, whether directly or via in-kind efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Americans for Prosperity led the effort on the No on CC side. Defend Colorado also spent significantly but, as they don’t disclose their spending, we can only see about $500k worth of cable ad-buys on their part. No on CC spent around $200k with the Colorado Union of Taxpayers and Colorado Rising Action also providing support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All told, the Yes on CC effort spent about $4 mln to the $2 mln spent by the No on CC side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Prop<\/a>
Prop CC Total Dollars Spent by Category<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Spending Mix<\/u><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Both sides of the Prop CC effort spent the bulk of their money on television. The Yes on CC effort spent the next greatest amount on direct mail, followed by digital. The No on CC group spent mostly on television, followed by direct mail, door knocking, and then digital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This mix of spending was similar to the 2018 election<\/a> where Democrat’s greatly outspent Republicans on digital advertising. However, in this race the Yes on CC effort spent significantly more on direct mail<\/a>. This makes sense because this is an off-year election cycle and these low-salience elections tend to be even more dominated by older voters<\/a> than usual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n